According to Court documents for case # 4:19-cr-00472-RM-JR., and other court documents, on or about December 18th, 2018, Wei Sun traveled overseas and knowingly and willfully exported and caused to be exported a defense-related article that was designated as a defense article on the United States Munitions List. The export by Wei Sun to the People’s Republic of China would be a violation of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
The complaint which was filed in the United States District Court of Arizona against Wei outlined that Wei informed a Raytheon Missile Systems official of his overseas travel plans and that Wei was informed not to take the computer with him overseas. The complaint was very clear that the Raytheon Missile Systems official directed Wei not to take his computer overseas since it contained ITAR controlled data and that taking the computer overseas would be a violation of company policy as well as prohibited under U.S. federal law.
Wei not only disobeyed the direct order, he subsequently while outside of the United States accessed the Raytheon Missile Systems computer network. Wei Sun then tendered his resignation while overseas via email he sent while logged in to the Raytheon network using his work email. According to the complaint, Wei indicated that he was planning to work and study overseas.
And then he returned…
On 1-14-2019, Wei Sun returned to the United States and on 1-15-2019, Wei Sun was interviewed by Raytheon Missile Systems security personnel. Initially, Wei Sun provided information that he had only traveled to Singapore and the Philippines. Wei Sun later admitted that he traveled to China, Cambodia, and Hong Kong with the Raytheon Missile Systems work computer despite being provided warnings and directions. Wei Sun also admitted that the computer contained ITAR controlled documents. Further, there is no information that Wei Sun had applied for or received the necessary approvals to export the ITAR documents.
The documents in question on Wei Sun’s computer were relevant to ongoing US air and missile defense systems programs.
During the ten years of employment with Raytheon, Wei Sun worked as an electrical engineer and had access to information directly related to sensitive and advanced missile defense technology which is regulated under the Arms and Export Control Act and is implemented under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) ARMS Export Control ACT
The Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778 (“AECA”), authorized the President of the United States to control the export of defense articles by designating certain categories of items as defense articles subject to import and export regulations. He now faces five charges related to his actions in Federal court.
Wei Sun has apparently subsequently pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Tucson, where Raytheon Missile Systems has a large defense plant that produces missiles. In a plea agreement with prosecutors, Sun acknowledged taking a Raytheon laptop to China on a 2018 personal trip and acknowledged that it contained sensitive material. Although the five-count indictment charging Sun did not specifically indicate that he provided any export-controlled information to a Chinese National, the act of physically transporting the laptop and accessing the network overseas knowingly is a construed an export.
A plea agreement by 48-year-old Wei Sun could reduce his stance significantly.
Sun previously pleaded not guilty in March 2019 to an earlier version of the indictment that included allegations related to other overseas trips to countries in addition to China.
Other former Raytheon employee also will be in Court in April 2020
Wei Sun is not the only naturalized US citizen that worked for Raytheon that recently was in court. According to a press release by the Department of Justice, Egyptian-born US Citizen Ahmedelhadi Yassin Serageldin, 66, admitted to removing classified national defense information from his and keeping it unsecured within his home. Serageldin was a systems engineer at Raytheon Company in Massachusetts from August 1997 until he was terminated in May 2017. Serageldin had a SECRET-level security clearance in order to complete his assignments on several defense contracts for the U.S. government involving military radar technology.
In 2017, Raytheon investigated Serageldin for time-card fraud. The time-card fraud investigation uncovered evidence that Serageldin had downloaded a substantial number of files from Raytheon’s computer network. Serageldin connected removable electronic storage devices to the network in violation of Raytheon’s security policy.
On December 13th, 2019, Serageldin pleaded guilty before Chief United States District Judge Patti B. Saris to a Superseding Information charging him with having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over numerous classified documents, writings, and notes relating to the national defense, and then willfully retaining the same and failing to deliver them to the United States. The prosecutor noted that while executing a search warrant at Serageldin’s house, federal agents found thousands of paper documents and electronic files belonging to Raytheon or the U.S. Department of Defense and that many of them were marked as containing classified information. Included in the documents pertaining to U.S. military programs involving missile defense and classified at the SECRET level.
According to a plea agreement filed in the case, the original charge of obstruction of justice will be dismissed at the time of sentencing. Sentencing is scheduled for April 14, 2020.
The charge of willfully retaining documents relating to the national defense and failing to deliver them to the United States provides for a sentence of no greater than 10 years in prison, three years of supervised release, a fine of $250,000 or twice the gain or loss, whichever is greatest, restitution, and forfeiture. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
This article is not legal advice.
This article is not legal advice. Many aspects of rockets and spacecraft fall under export control laws. Even things that may seem to appear benign or seemingly harmless may be export-controlled. Many companies like Raytheon employe high trained people to help navigate export control laws. Should you have questions about legal concerns including export control, seek guidance from your company or a lawyer. This article does not directly intend to pass judgment on the actions of the individuals mentioned.
About The Author
Bill D’Zio
Co-Founder at WestEastSpace.com
Bill founded WestEastSpace.com after returning to China in 2019 to be supportive of his wife’s career. Moving to China meant leaving the US rocket/launch industry behind, as the USA and China don’t see eye to eye on cooperation in space. Bill has an engineering degree and is an experienced leader of international cross-functional teams with experience in evaluating, optimizing and awarding sub-contracts for complex systems. Bill has worked with ASME Components, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) for use in launch vehicles, satellites, aerospace nuclear, and industrial applications.
Bill provides consulting services for engineering, supply chain, and project management.
I kind of feel bad for the guy.